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Hunger and Market Dynamics in Pre-modern  
Communities: Insights into the Effects of Market  
Intervention from a Multi-agent Model 
Ulf Christian Ewert & Mathias Roehl &  
Adelinde M. Uhrmacher ∗ 
Abstract: »Hungerkrisen und Marktdynamik in vormoder-
nen Gemeinwesen: Erkenntnisse zur Wirkung von Markt-
interventionen auf Basis eines Multi-Agenten-Modells«. 
Food shortages and hunger had been a great threat to the 
standard of living in urban communities in the Middle Ages 
and in early modern times. In order to cope with this sort of 
critical events, local governments and municipal councils 
commonly tried to control market dynamics, but it is not 
clear, whether in cases like this the typical market reaction 
of rising prices of foodstuffs and wages could really be 
moderated in the long-run through an intervention in mar-
kets. In the present article, a simplified multi-agent-based 
model of the pre-modern urban economy is used which al-
lows a simulation of effects that different strategies of crisis 
management had on the medium-term and long-range eco-
nomic and demographic developments in an urban commu-
nity experiencing a food shortage. Intervention in markets 
turns out to be a strategic choice of local authorities by 
which very likely wealth-destroying consequences of food 
shortages or even famines could be reduced to some extent. 
A successful intervention preventing a temporary food 
shortage turning into a substantial nutritional crisis nonethe-
less had to be goal-directed and of complex design, and 
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showed its full wealth-keeping effects only after a consid-
erably long period of time. 
1. Adverse effects of food shortages: a late medieval  
example and some questions 
A crisis in general puts the regular routines of a society and sometimes also the 
society itself at risk.1 This was true indeed for medieval and early modern 
urban communities in Europe. However, most Europeans in early twentyfirst 
century do know the misery that is caused by epidemics, famines or natural 
disasters from television pictures only, pictures that usually are taken in distant 
Third World countries. The “New Orleans crisis” in the summer of 2005 
(Knauer 2005; Birch/Wachter 2005; Giroux 2006; Bugliarello 2007), a total 
breakdown of urban life resulting from the hurricane “Katrina” and a flood that 
had set wide metropolitan areas under water presumably would be a powerful 
and instructive reminder for that European societies had been hit quite regu-
larly by comparable disasters only very few generations back in time. Especially 
food shortages, hunger and epidemics had been a constant restriction and draw-
back to the standard of living that could be enjoyed by the people living in pre-
modern cities and towns. In such events, which easily could turn into severe 
mortality crises, urban communities not only had to cope with price volatility 
and with excess mortality alone. Usually, communities had also to face a loss 
of births and the likelihood of a complete paralysis of local markets, circum-
stances that in the long-run very well could trigger demographic stagnation and 
a welfare-decreasing economic development (Walter/Schofield 1989). Very 
unstable market conditions and temporary excess mortality thus were a com-
mon daily life experience for Europeans until the epoch of Enlightenment and 
until the Industrial Revolution, a fact that nowadays simply has almost com-
pletely ceased from the cultural memory of Europe. Watching on television the 
extreme difficulties local authorities in New Orleans had to evacuate the city 
and to provide the inhabitants encircled by the water with foodstuffs and medi-
cal care therefore certainly was remarkable inasmuch as this real life scene was 
vividly recalling how easily exogenous shocks can endanger economic and 
social structures, even those of a highly developed society.2 
                                                          
1  In contrast to the more neutral ancient greek meaning of the word, crisis is understood 
herein as an event having negative consequences and also being seen as such by the people 
concerned. (Koselleck 1982). 
2  Although consequences were much better managed, the earthquake in Kobe, Japan, in 1995 
would be another quite recent example for a modern city in a highly industrialised country 
to be striken by a natural disaster causing many casualities and big physical damages. See 
on this e.g. Horvich 2000. 
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Going again much further back in time, food shortages, famines and epi-
demics in late medieval urban communities do offer many insights into the 
dynamics of local markets during crises and the management of such critical 
events. Such an example for both the vulnerability to external shocks and the 
ability to compensate adverse impacts resulting from these shocks is the series 
of adverse events the Flemish city of Lille had been faced with in early fif-
teenth century. In fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries the city of Lille was 
quite a prosperous and wealthy town.3 Moreover, it was the centre of admini-
stration in the county of Flanders and then became, after Flanders had come 
under Burgundian rule, for some time the most important place of residence 
and administration within the northern territories of the dukes of Burgundy.4 
Quite difficult times nevertheless then started in the year 1400 when a big fire 
destroyed large areas of the city. As a consequence, town markets of grain and 
labour broke down instantaneously, leaving behind people unemployed and in 
starvation and misery (Calonne/Clauzel 1974: 375 f., 378-382). For once, not a 
harvest failure but a disaster was responsable for severe shortcomings in the 
provision of inhabitants with food and for their temporary malnutrition. Only a 
few months later things became even worse with the advent of the second 
major wave of the bubonic plague in Northwestern Europe after 1348. By this 
epidemic many inhabitants of the city were killed, and the fact that citizens 
already had been weakened from the poor living conditions caused by the fire 
some months before certainly exacerbated the consequences of the outbreak of 
plague. The story of crises to occur recurrently then continued in 1408/09, in 
1414/15 and again in 1436-39 with severe nutritional crises respectively, the 
latter of these having been a major European-wide famine that was caused by 
three consecutive harvest failures.5 In 1415/16 and in 1435 the situation got 
more complicated, because the areas nearby Lille had been subject to the pil-
lage and ravage of through coming troops.6 These events of course were devas-
tating for the town, again taking away many lives and hampering the standard 
                                                          
3  See on the economic development of the city Sivéry 1970: 235-257. 
4  Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy, who in 1369 married Margret of Flanders, daughter of 
the last Count of Flanders, Louis of Male, came to power in Flanders after his father-in-law 
had died in early 1384. Until the late 1420s and early 1430s when during the reign of his 
grandson Philip the Good other important northern territories like Brabant, Holland and 
Sealand were integrated into the Burgundian state, Lille functioned as the centre of admini-
stration in the North where the central institution of the chamber of revenues and accounts 
was located. (Sivéry 1970: 219-227, Vaughan 1975; Clauzel 1982, 1989 and 2004). 
5  Even for late medival standards the famine was perceived as being extremely harsh, which 
is also documented by a statement of duke Philip the Good saying that people in his north-
ern territories were suffering from starvation as they had never done before. (Ca-
lonne/Clauzel 1974: 381 f.) 
6  In late 1415 und early 1416 French troops beaten in Azincourt ravaged the landscape 
nearby Lille, and in September 1435, after the treaty of Arras between France and Bur-
gundy, English troops moved through the county of Artois and West Flanders, pillaging and 
ravaging these areas. (Calonne/Clauzel 1974: 380 f.) 
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of living for all surviving inhabitants for many years to come (Calonne/Clauzel 
1974: 376 f.). 
These examples from late medieval Lille underline that food shortages due 
to whatever causes in pre-modern urban communities certainly were a serious 
threat not only to the lifes of citizens but also to the structure of the urban 
economy, therefore reducing the standard of living of people in the short-term 
as well as in the medium-term and in the long-run. What is now questionable 
about this topic? That municipal councils tried to manage this sort of event is 
understandable and too obvious to dispute. And it is also clear, that cities and 
towns employed a set of distinct measures in order to get along with the possi-
bly wealth-destroying market dynamics that usually unfolded in such situa-
tions. A short overview of the role the local grain market played in pre-modern 
towns and its dynamic behaviour in times of food shortage is given in the fol-
lowing section of this article. Potential objectives city governments aimed at 
with market intervention and with their approaches to crisis management are 
reexamined in this section as well. What seems not to be quite clear is whether 
such an intervention in markets was a successful strategy. Could the loss of 
welfare inhabitants usually suffered from during and after food shortages sig-
nificantly be reduced through a manipulation of market mechanisms and the 
administration of markets?7 Of course, medieval and early modern time series 
of grain prices are very well displaying periods of price stability and periods of 
price volatility, but they do not allow for a valuable discrimination of whether 
the typical reduction in both level and variance of prices after times of dearth 
was due to crisis management itself or whether it was caused instead, either 
exogenously or endogenously, by other factors. A downward shift in demand, a 
supply with grain imports or simply an excellent follow-up harvest can be such 
determinants independent from municipal crisis management initiatives. 
Hence, a modelling approach is taken herein allowing, based on a multi-agent 
model of a pre-modern urban economy, the simulation of market dynamics 
during and after a food shortage. With this particular approach the relative 
impact of market intervention can be assessed in a comparison of simulated 
alternative paths of market development. The model is presented in section 3 
below. In section 4 some results from the simulation of different crisis man-
agement scenarios are discussed. 
2. The management of food shortage and hunger:  
a seemingly never ending pre-modern story 
In pre-modern urban communities provisioning citizens with sufficient quanti-
ties of food was a key element with respect to the determination of living stan-
                                                          
7  This question is also raised in Persson 1999: 88. 
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dards. Well into the nineteenth century food shortages and hunger were none-
theless a quite regular experience of city dwellers. Only with industrialisation 
starting in nineteenth century and with modern economic growth8 it became 
possible for Europeans to escape from hunger permanently (Fogel 1992, Fogel 
2004). It is also worthwhile mentioning, that the resurgence of urban settle-
ments in the Middle Ages as an alternative economic, social and political 
model to feudalism had been promoted by some profound structural changes. 
These changes in general lifted the standard of living of European populations: 
a significant upward shift in agricultural productivity in eleventh and twelfth 
centuries that was due to several technological advances9 and an improvement 
in climate has caused population growth. And it also enabled a substantial 
though even still small part of the population to be exempted from the produc-
tion of basic nutrients and to afford a life in towns, producing and trading all 
sorts of commodities. As a result of these favourable living conditions until 
around the early fourteenth century thousands of towns were newly founded all 
across western and central Europe and interregional and long-distance trade has 
been rivived in the so-called “Commercial Revolution”.10 Agricultural produc-
tivity could not be increased much thereafter until only the eighteenth century 
(Campbell/Overton 1991, Clark 1992). And the substantial climatic degrada-
tion which is known as the “Little Ice Age” and lasted for roughly 500 years 
reaching its minimum temperaturewise in seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries11, agricultural production and therefore also the provision of the 
population with foodstuffs became a subject to severe and regular drawbacks, 
more than it probably had been before. As a consequence, the standard of liv-
ing of people in terms of their nutritional status was depressed, which in part 
can be traced by a secular decline in human height.12 
                                                          
8  »Modern economic growth« is a concept designed to discriminate in a typifying manner the 
pattern of economic and population growth that had evolved beginning with the industriali-
sation from the growth pattern European economies had experienced before. Apart from 
being characterised by high growth rates of both income and population, by changes in the 
sectoral composition of the economy and by increases in the productivity and in the degree 
of market integration, this »modern« growth pattern is, for a considerable period of time at 
least, also self-enhancing. (Kuznets 1973) 
9  Lopez 1976 [1998], Chapter 2: The Growth of Self-Centered Agriculture, 27-55. 
10  See on this in general Lopez 1976 [1998]. 
11  See on the development of temperature and precipitation during the last millenium Glaser 
1997, Glaser/Beyer/Beck 1999 and Glaser 2001: 181. Le Roy Ladurie 2004 also provides 
an in-depth discussion of this climatic change and the social consequences resulting from it. 
12  See on the impact climate had on population development in pre-modern Europe Lee 1981; 
Galloway 1986 and 1988; Grove 2002. Considerations on the long-run changes in human 
height in Europe are given by Koepke/Baten 2005. As height to some extent mirrors the 
impact of environmental factors to which humans have been exposed to during their growth 
phase, average height can be taken as a proxy-measure for the net-nutritional status of a 
population. A secular decrease in height during the »Little Ice Age« can only be inferred to 
with indirect evidience. Such an indirect evidence is, that Europeans seemingly grew rela-
tively tall before the »Little Ice Age« (Steckel 2004), that they were severely stunted in late 
 127
A causal nexus between the relative overall stagnation in both population 
growth and economic growth which can be observed during late Middle Ages 
and in early modern times and quite adverse living conditions was first claimed 
by the English scholar Thomas Robert Malthus. In his Essay on the principle of 
population published in 1798 (Malthus 1798 [1976]). Malthus developed a 
framework in which he systematically described the ups and downs in the level 
of the standard of living over time. He derived a plausible explanation by as-
suming the population in general tending to grow more rapidly than the sup-
porting resources which are necessary for a sufficient supply with food. As a 
consequence, food shortages and nutritional crises develop, forcing people to 
the edge of subsistence or even below this level. In the view of Malthus these 
events together with epidemics were so-called positive checks to population 
growth during which the population number was temporarily reduced through 
excess mortality to a feasible number again. In the long-run, this negative feed-
back loop kept population and the economy in a balance, but did not allow for 
either substantial economic growth or demographic expansion. It definitely 
comes with some irony, that Malthus published his study first at a time when 
the process of industrialisation just has set off, a structural economic change 
that made it later on possible for European populations to cope better and better 
with the threat of a nutritional crisis. 
Bearing in mind the crucial importance of food provision in the pre-modern 
world, food markets naturally have to be the focus of attention. Via urban food 
markets the produce of the agricultural sector was distributed to its consumers 
in the sectors of production and services. Thus, food markets were one element 
by which the rural and urban spheres of the economy were linked.13 And as 
grain and bread are basic nutrients, of all food markets the market for grain was 
presumably most important and does have of course a prominent position 
within the analysis of pre-modern urban living standards. Many surviving long 
series of grain prices from the Middle Ages and from early modern times obvi-
ously provide a good empirical basis for such an analysis14, but this is certainly 
not the only reason why focussing especially on grain markets. Although har-
vest yields and levels of grain prices empirically were not perfectly correlated 
with each other, rising prices commonly were caused by substantial crop fail-
ures (Persson 1999: 62-63).15 It is also known, that consumers usually reacted 
                                                                                                                          
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries (Komlos 2003; Ewert 2004) and still remained 
relatively small also in mid-eighteenth century (Baten 2001). 
13  Cf. for this the chapters in Chartres 1990. 
14  See in general Braudel/Spooner 1967. Of course, only few of the numerous examples can 
be named here: Goubert 1960 (Beauvais in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries); Mestayer 
1963 (Douai 1329-1793); Sivéry 1965 (Valenciennes in fourteenth and fifteenth centuries); 
Frêche/Frêche 1967 (Toulouse 1486-1868); Baulant 1968 (Paris 1431-1788); Tits-Dieuaide 
1975 (Brabant and Flanders in fithteeth century); Ebeling/Irsigler 1977 (Cologne 1368-
1797). 
15  See also Hoskins 1964 and 1968. 
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inelastically to increases in grain or bread prices because of the basic nature of 
these foodstuffs.16 Price movements for grain and bread and the quantities 
traded therefore do pretty much reflect changes in the availability of basic 
foodstuffs, and it can be inferred from this, with a sufficient degree of accuracy 
at least, whether or not citizens were able to meet the level of subsistence. 
What could have been done to ensure the provision of (urban) populations 
with grain? And which options commonly were realised to do so? In the case of 
Lille several reactions of the municipal council can be observed. During the 
famine of 1436/39 grain was publicly provided and private persons who owned 
grain were ordered to sell their inventories for a “fair” price. Grain exports 
from the city were prohibited at the same time, the grain market was monitored 
and bakers were ordered to bake specific types and sizes of their bread and to 
use the more expensive wheat for the production of cakes only (Ca-
lonne/Clauzel 1974: 381 f., Clauzel 1982: 213). This set of measures imple-
mented in late medieval Lille gives quite a good picture of what public inter-
vention in pre-modern urban communities was about. This picture is in total 
accordance with the well-known and well-established fact that local govern-
ments tried to smooth erratic price movements both by closely monitoring 
markets and through intervening in the market mechanism.17 A stereotyped and 
quite classical reaction was the public supply of grain that had been put to stock 
beforehand. This practice of running public granaries (Erjnœs/Persson 1999) 
goes back to ancient times (Garnsey 1988) and was in medieval Europe most 
developed in the Italian urban communities and city states at first. The effects 
of the storage of grain on market dynamics can be very well grasped with his-
torical data on prices. Time series of grain prices are typically characterised by 
serial correlation, the main reason for that being changes in stocks of grain 
within towns. Prices rose because of a harvest failure in one year, but they 
usually remained at a high level even if next year’s harvest did not fail again. 
Supply from the already depleted granaries then was no longer possible and an 
increase in demand in order to restock granaries reduced the quantities of grain 
that were available to inhabitants immediately furthermore, putting the grain 
price under additional pressure. Vice versa, an excellent harvest not only led to 
decreases in the price of grain in that particular year, it could keep prices at a 
fairly low level also in the following year, because by storing it grain could be 
carried over from one harvest period to the next. Thus, increasing the quantities 
of grain to be traded on the market helped to lower prices in the short-term 
(Persson 1999: 55). And it was because of these decreases in price why the 
                                                          
16  Newer estimates of the elasticity of demand for grain derived from early modern and nine-
teenth century data from England, Southern Scandinavia, Central France (Bourges) and 
Southwest France (Bordeaux) are given in Persson 1999: 52-54. All raw estimates lie be-
tween -0.2 and -0.9, but for Scandinavia the estimate is corrected for the impact of trade 
and inventory to a more plausible value of around -0.6. 
17  See on this in general Basini 1960; Ebeling 1979; Outhwait 1981; Matozzi 1983; McClos-
key/Nash 1984; Nielsen 1997. 
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provision of the population with food could be secured and why it also was 
possible to reduce the likelihood for market take-overs of private merchants 
and for huge profits to be made by them from speculation.18 
What were the likely objectives of municipal councils and local govern-
ments when being faced with a food shortage? And for what reason municipal 
councils were doing this? Although initially being thought as a societal model 
with members possessing an equal juridicial status, the immense economic and 
social dynamics connected to it had produced all across Europe already in the 
late Middle Ages urban communities in which social structure now was highly 
hierarchical and segregated. Municipal councils typically recruited their mem-
bers from the social élites of the town, these encompassing a limited number of 
leading families and forming dense social networks and rather closed circles 
which hardly could be entered by newcomers. As usually these ruling élites, 
merchants for instance, had strong economic and political interests, a plausible 
common statement to be made regarding their objective would be assuming 
them to have had a primary concern about preserving their political legitimacy 
in order to stay in a powerful and influential position. Holding such a position 
was the prerequisite for fulfilling economic interests. In terms of political 
economy this behaviour can be described as rent seeking, because members of 
municipal councils could call on income derived from the use of their political 
influence for sharing vested or even obvious economic interests.19 Thus, dis-
content within the urban population, that very likely could be caused by unfa-
vourable market dynamics and shortages of food provision, had in any case to 
be avoided. Smoothing price volatility, providing people with food and admin-
istering markets were certainly strategies for municipal councils that were 
suitable to prevent upheaval and uprising and to reject market take-overs by 
single merchants. Regulating markets also was good at making believe inhabi-
tants suffering from continuous price instability that insider trading and specu-
lation was under control (Persson 1999: 75). In addition, by ensuring a certain 
                                                          
18  Persson 1999: 62-64, using mid-seventeenth century grain prices from Southern Scandina-
via, shows that even in a series of consecutive bad harvests – the »seven lean years« as they 
were labelled in early modern times with a reminiscence to the famous story of the Old Tes-
tament – food shortage in principle could have been smoothed out in the long-run by a 
proper management of grain stocks. In this example (1645-1651) the lack of available grain 
aggregated over time counted for only between a half and a full year of consumption which 
not automatically would have caused deprivation, because the single spells of dearth were 
much shorter. Deprivation was a consequence only of the extreme short-term rises of grain 
prices. See also Persson 1996. 
19  In modern societies rent seeking commonly describes private persons’ aims at capturing 
monopoly rents on a particular market with the help of politicians who had been persuaded 
by these persons to procreate and to protect such monopolies (Tollison 1982). As in pre-
modern societies and urban communities there was no such clear-cut distinction between 
the private and the public sphere, the term »rent seeking« can be used under these circum-
stances to describe attempts of persons in influential political positions to shape urban insti-
tutions in a way that these institutions can fulfill a person’s own private interests (Lehmann 
2004: 46). 
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level of consumption the price stabilising attempts of municipal councils gen-
erated a positive external effect concerning the nutritional status of citizens and 
their standard of living (Ravaillon 1988). Through extended stints of malnutri-
tion during the human growth period not only the final height that can be at-
tained, but also health status and even life expectation for the remaining life of 
people are negatively affected.20 By focussing on price stabilisation municipal 
councils also relieved in part such spells of malnutrition and delivered a public 
good insofar as this was beneficial for all citizens and thus of non-exclusive 
nature (Persson 1999: 72). This notwithstanding, very unlikely the preservation 
of the inhabitants’ health status itself was a primary concern of municipal 
councils in medieval and early modern towns. Contributing to higher living 
standards instead was more or less a by-product of their short-term economic 
and political aims. With rent seeking it was first of all necessary to keep the 
current distribution of political and economic power in a balance. A population 
in the long run being healthier was of no obvious additional value in such a 
rationale. 
3. Modelling markets and market dynamics:  
a multi-agent-approach 
For purposes of assessment and analysis of the implications that market inter-
ventions had during food shortages and famines, a multi-agent-based simula-
tion model of a pre-modern urban economy is used. This model is built on the 
grounds of the behavioural concept of rational choice, this implying the stan-
dard assumptions made in economic theory about the decision making of pro-
ducers and consumers.21 It is implemented on the computer in JAMES, a Java-
based Agent Modelling Environment for Simulation, which supports the dis-
tributed, parallel execution and testing of multiple heterogeneous, for instance 
either reactive, deliberative or hybrid agents (Schattenberg/Uhrmacher 2001). 
This model of a pre-modern urban economy consists of several markets and 
different actor groups. Each of these groups comprises a set of individual 
households and they vary regarding the preferences and the behavioural pat-
terns of their respective members. As such groups of actors merchants, crafts-
men and labourers are distinguished. In the urban economy modelled that way 
merchants are responsible for the citizens’ provision with grain. Craftsmen 
produce commodities and services, which they sell to the other agents in the 
economy. Craftsmen and merchants hire labourers, who form the third actor 
group, for their businesses, enabling the labourers to earn money to buy grain, 
                                                          
20  See for a longer discussion of this argument Tanner 1994 and Persson 1999: 31-39. 
21  See for a more detailed description of the structure of this model also Ewert/Roehl/Uhr-
macher 2001 and 2003. 
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consumer products and services. Extending an earlier version of the model 
(Ewert/Roehl/Uhrmacher 2001 and 2003), each household now is modelled in 
greater detail and embraces itself a number of individuals, at least one female 
or male adult. If both a female and a male adult are present and a sufficient 
amount of grain can be purchased, new children are born with a certain prob-
ability depending on the number of children already living in the household and 
the time having passed since birth of the last child. Children having reached the 
age of 16 are announced to the marriage market of the model. In case of mar-
riage the child and its spouse leave their according parental households and a 
new household is created. Mortality events are calculated for each individual 
depending on its age and whether the subsistence level has been met. If both 
adult persons of a household have died, the whole household vanishes. 
Merchants, craftsmen and labourers are modelled as utility-based and reac-
tive agents. In an economic theoretical framework this means assuming rational 
choices of agents and expecting them to maximise their utility and their profits. 
This rational economic behaviour of all agents is coordinated by the institution 
of markets where agents sell und buy goods. The supply and the demand of 
grain, commodities, services and labour is assumed to follow the basic princi-
ples that can be derived from neoclassical economic theory. Suppliers want to 
maximise their profits by selling their products and assets, and consumers want 
to maximise the utility they derive from consuming grain or other commodities 
instead, respectively. Basically, this rule implies, that in general consumers 
increase their demand for goods with decreasing prices and reduce it with in-
creasing prices, whereas producers increase their supply of goods with rising 
prices and vice versa.22 Since agents interact with each other via the markets in 
this urban economy, price dynamics are driven by the ratio of supply to de-
mand. Market clearing prices can be identified as those prices for which supply 
and demand quantities would be identical so that a particular good can be ex-
changed for money.23 Agents are in a sense reactive insofar as their decisions 
are determined by income and price level. Actions to be taken on all markets 
are calculated for each household in the model. 
Besides these numerous reactive agents classified into the three actor groups 
described above a deliberative single agent is added to the model, who repre-
sents a group of decision makers within the urban society and can be described 
as the town’s local authorities or local government. In Lille for instance the 
municipal administration called magistrat, échevinage or loy in late fourteenth 
and early fifteenth centuries had more than forty members in total, but the 
important body of decision was the municipal council called the collège des 
douze échevins, which consisted of twelve citizens from honourable families of 
                                                          
22  See on this in general Varian 1999. In the present model a Cobb-Douglas function with 
labour input only is assumed for production, whereas consumer decisions are modelled in a 
Klein-Rubin utility function (Ewert/Roehl/Uhrmacher 2003: 178-181). 
23  See on the theory of competitive markets Gravelle/Rees 2004: 170-189. 
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the city and changed composition once a year at the date of All Saints.24 The 
local authorities do raise their funds by collecting taxes, and in contrast to the 
other agents in the model, who only can react to market dynamics, this particu-
lar agent not only is capable of deliberately affecting market developments 
through interventions, but is also allowed to administer markets and to imple-
ment other regulations conditioning the economic behaviour of all other agents. 
As it was commonly the case in late medieval and early modern urban commu-
nities, in Lille the municipal administration was responsible for the city’s fi-
nances and its bookkeeping. The council levied direct taxes from households 
(taille) and indirect taxes (assise) from the ongoing commerce of grain, wine 
and beer on the markets of the city (Clauzel 1982: 65-67). The internal struc-
ture of this agent, that is its behavioural pattern, thus embraces beliefs, desires 
and intentions.25 It is assumed furthermore, that in the event of a nutritional 
crisis the local authorities’ main objective is to stabilise prices, and as a conse-
quence consumption and production, and to protect the assets and the state of 
welfare of citizens to the largest degree possible, because otherwise citizens are 
likely to revolt threatening the political legitimacy of the municipal council.26 
The local authorities agent in the model is therefore focussing the activities on 
the development of the citizens’ satisfaction with their actual state of welfare, 
this being based on their perception of relative changes in wealth over time.27 
The structure of the model is schematically displayed in Figure 1. 
                                                          
24  The recruitement of the members of municipal council in addition was influenced by the 
duke of Burgundy, who was the lord and official owner of the city (Clauzel 1982: 63-84). 
This right was based on a contract between the community of Lille and the countess of 
Flanders dating back to the year 1235 (Sivéry 1970: 288 f). 
25  Agents of this kind are called BDI-agents, the »BDI« standing for beliefs, desires and 
intentions. With »beliefs« the type of information the agent has on the actual state of reality 
is described, whereas the way the agent would like reality to look like is called »desires«. 
»Intentions« are those desires an agent has committed itself to pursue. Typically with this a 
plan is associated with the purpose of changing reality such that its future state matches the 
agent’s »desires« (Bratman 1987). 
26  The municipal council of Lille for instance fixed the amount of grain necessary for subsis-
tence to four rasières of grain for each person per annum. This accounted for about 0.75 
litres of grain each day. This level could be reduced to only three rasières if a food shortage 
lasted for longer time (Marquant 1940: 126). 
27  From a historical point of view it is of course quite simplifying to assume local authorities 
being a single agent. Not only was power in pre-modern urban communities usually exe-
cuted by social élites, but also the members of this leading group often each had conflicting 
purposes. However, assuming a rent seeking behaviour of the members of the leading po-
litical class, that is expecting them to have used their political competence to fulfil vested 
economic interests, would mean that only decisions would have been taken by which each 
member believed to maximise his political rent. Thus, members of a municipal council had 
to compromise, otherwise no specific action could have been taken by the council. Model-
ling the local authorities as one agent only nonetheless is justified from both the historical 
and the modelling perspective insofar as the focus of analysis herein is on the impact deci-
sions had on market intervention, rather than on explaining the process of decision making. 
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Figure 1: Markets, agents and actor groups, and their markets interactions 
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This specification allows the simulation of market development in a pre-
modern economy over time. Starting with different conditions potential out-
comes can be traced and analysed. However, why using a simulation approach? 
Simulation techniques certainly are not a standard method in historical analy-
sis. Only a few rare examples, historical simulations with a scientific back-
ground are found in the literature.28 Nevertheless, applying simulation to the 
analysis of historical phenomena makes very much sense indeed, because 
simulation supports experiments with models and therefore makes it possible to 
analyse the dynamic behaviour of a particular system under study. “What if ” 
scenarios can be explored, an approach to historical explanation by which real 
life historical processes can be evaluated through a comparison with a counter-
factual world.29 In the application of simulation techniques herein it is aimed at 
                                                          
28  To name only two of these rare examples, these are for instance the simulation of the 
Industrial Revolution (see Komlos/Artzrouni 1990 and Komlos/Artzrouni 1994) and the 
analysis focussing on demographic stagnation in early modern German urban communities 
(see McIntosh 2001). 
29  The counterfactual approach is one of the characteristics – others are the use of economic 
theory, the explicit formulation of hypotheses, the explicit measurement and the use of 
econometric methods – of the so-called »New Economic History« that was initiated in late 
1950s and early 1960s by the studies of Conrad and Meyer (1958) on the profitable nature 
of the slave economy in the antebellum United States and of Fogel (1964) on the role rail-
ways played in United States’ industrialisation. It is presumably also the most controversial 
of these methodological principles, although each historical causal explanation in a very 
strict sense is derived in a comparison of historical reality with an alternative realisation of 
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assessing possible effects of market interventions by the local authorities in a 
pre-modern urban community. How do economic variables change over time 
once a nutritional crisis has developed with and without interventions of the 
municipal council? What specific impact do different intervention strategies 
have? Econometric analysis of historical time series data can be an excellent 
approach to this as long as data are available. For the dynamics of grain mar-
kets this is a viable approach.30 In contrast, precise and continuous data on 
many other economic variables, on population figures and on environmental 
factors which would be a necessary prerequisite for the estimation of market 
intervention effects are almost lacking.31 Simulation seems therefore to be an 
appropriate methodological choice to find an answer to these questions. 
Why then using a multi-agent design? As is indicated with the RoboCup 
Rescue project multi-agent simulation approaches are quite popular in the con-
text of crisis management.32 Regarding the analysis of systems the most impor-
tant shortcoming of the more traditional simulation models is that they are 
restricted to the coverage of the system’s macro-structures only. In such models 
macro-level dynamics are generated by defining functional relations between 
macro-level variables, a feature that is suitable of course to a wide range of 
problems in economic and social sciences.33 In contrast, with a multi-agent 
design the prevailing focus on the macro-level of system is left behind. In such 
multi-agent models the macro-level dynamics do result from many single ac-
tions taken by the numerous agents on the micro-level of the system.34 Con-
cerning market processes this appears to be an approach to the modelling of 
(historical) reality that is much more adequate.35 Moreover, the multi-agent 
design allows to explicitly include heterogeneity of the agents’ behaviour into 
models instead of being forced to assume a single “representative” economic 
agent as is the case in classical macro-level oriented economic models. 
Whereas, for instance, all agents within one of the three actor groups of the 
                                                                                                                          
history, one that could have been possible, but in most explanations is not explicitly de-
fined. (Sarrazin 1980: 82-86). 
30  See for instance the analysis of Bac/Chevet/Ghysels 2001 on Toulouse and Paris grain 
prices. 
31  Persson 1999: pp. 88-89, calls on several cases from seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
where it is to some extent possible to distinguish market dynamics with and without regula-
tion and public intervention, but admits, that drops in price volatility that are observed can-
not safely be attributed to a more intense market regime only. 
32  Robocup Rescue is a multi-agent simulation framework which can simulate disasters and 
the coordination of the multiple rescue units that are employed in such situations. Also the 
project aims at replacing persons in rescue teams by robots and developing information sys-
tems that can assist rescue forces in their decision making. Cf. Takahashi et al. 2002. 
33  An example is the demographic-economic model of pre-industrial Netherlands in de Vries 
1984/85. 
34  See on the logic of multi-agent models applied to phenomena discussed in social science in 
general Doran 1996; Epstein/Axtell 1996; Epstein 1999; Gilbert/Troitzsch 2005. 
35  The multi-agent method is applied in economics for a wide range of market problems to be 
modelled. See on this LeBaron 2000; Tesfatsion 2001. 
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present model share an identical behavioural pattern, each individual agent has 
different assets at hand, can be hit by a nutritional crisis to a different degree 
and can reach different levels of income by using assets in a different manner 
during the course of a simulation. Thus, individual situations, decision proc-
esses and activities can be described. The opportunity to capture heterogeneity 
becomes even more important in modelling the activities of the local authori-
ties agent within the model. A particular local authorities’ intervention in mar-
kets designed to help the members in one of the actor groups is not automati-
cally beneficial for the members of other actor groups as well. Being without 
employment, a labourer agent would probably welcome a municipal job crea-
tion programme, whereas a craftsmen would face difficulties finding employ-
ees due to the crowding-out effect resulting from public labour market activi-
ties. Although even with the feature of including heterogeneity the structure of 
the herein proposed multi-agent model is still quite simple when compared to a 
very complex historical reality, this particular design nonetheless possesses 
many of the ingredients that did characterise the structure of economic interac-
tions in pre-modern towns and the social composition of such communities. 
The rather simplified design of the model aims at balancing mathematical and 
computational tractability with the quest of historians for a more detailed de-
scription of the relevant markets and agents. 
4. Market reaction patterns during crisis and thereafter:  
a comparison of scenarios 
The multi-agent model is used for the simulation of market dynamics in pre-
modern urban communities that followed food shortages. The population size 
of the model town is assumed to encompass between 15,000 and 17,000 inhabi-
tants (individual agents) falling into 150 merchants’ households, 250 house-
holds of craftsmen and 2,000 labourers’ households, each household having 
about 4-5 children on average. These population figures do match those of late 
medieval Lille where population is estimated to had been in the range of 
15,000-20,000 inhabitants (Sivéry 1970: 198-202, Clauzel 1982: 32 f.). By late 
medieval and pre-modern standards this would have been quite a big town. 
Once agents have been added to the population of the model with a certain 
probability – after they were “born”, so to speak –, they grow up, becoming 
older as the simulation process advances in time. Each simulation cycle is 
representing one week of physical time. 
The growth of the population in the town depends partly on its natural re-
production rate and partly on the amount of in-migration, which in the model is 
exogenously given. A social differential in fertility is assumed inasmuch as a 
higher fertility rate is expected to pertain to the actor group of labourers 
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(Ewert/Roehl/Uhrmacher 2003: 185). The number of inhabitants is continu-
ously reduced by death or emigration. With malnutrition the probability of 
death increases for all individuals. These mortality rates due to malnutrition are 
assumed to be extremely high for all types of agents. By assuming these high 
probabilities the well-established fact is taken into account that with malnutri-
tion continuing for a considerable period of time people became more prone to 
plague and diseases36 from which they die regardless of their social status. 
Nevertheless, merchants and craftsmen do have in general a higher potential to 
survive a nutritional crisis because their usually greater wealth allows them in 
an event like this to cope better with price instability and large increases in 
prices for foodstuffs.37 
Figure 2: Development of market prices 
 
 
Such a food shortage is simulated by simply cutting back large proportions 
of the merchants’ grain supply to the urban community for a particular period 
of time. Exactly this is the counter-factual which cannot be observed in histori-
cal reality, but is needed as a point of reference for the assessment of market 
dynamics under a public intervention regime. In this example the food short-
ages lasts for one year of physical time or, in terms of simulation time, for 52 
simulation cycles. As the provision of a pre-modern population with grain 
largely depended on the harvest cycle, a one-year-period was a quite typical 
                                                          
36  Cf. Mokyr/O’Grada 2002, who can show this with statistics on the causes of death within 
the mid 1840’s Irish potato famine. 
37  For merchants and craftsmen a probability of mortality of 0.95 is assumed, whereas for 
labourers it is 0.99 (Ewert/Roehl/Uhrmacher 2003: 185). 
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time span for food shortages and famines. Very often, if next year’s harvest 
was considerably better then the one before, a crisis could be immediately 
stopped by the time this harvest was available. Which effects of a simulated 
food shortage can be then observed? In Figure 2 price movements are shown. 
Figure 3: Development of the population by actor groups during and after a 
major nutritional crisis 
 
 
Because of the scarcity of grain, prices of grain rise tremendously (see top 
panel of Figure 2), forcing many of those persons who are most vulnerable 
regarding their status of welfare to living conditions below the subsistence 
level. Thus, by introducing exogenously conditions that lead to a temporary 
food shortage, a severe nutritional crisis then can develop endogenously in the 
model. The sharp increase of grain price in the simulation mirrors the dynamics 
that usually can be seen in historical price data. In the food shortage of Lille 
within early fifteenth century, the grain price tripled with respect to its pre-
crisis level in the events of 1408/09 and 1414/15 and nearly quadrupled in the 
severe famine of 1436/39 (Calonne/Clauzel 1974: 368). In this type of crisis 
the agents of the group of labourers are hit with the most hefty impact38: about 
one third to one half of them die in the process because of malnutrition. A 
series of wages of carpenters and construction workers in fifteenth century 
Lille allows to calculate their nutritional opportunities. Facing a sharp increase 
in the price of grain these workers in the famine of 1436/39 were not able to 
buy enough foodstuff to meet the level of subsistence even when they earned 
                                                          
38  This result corresponds to findings from the analysis of pre-modern food shortages (Persson 
1999: 63-64). 
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money (Calonne/Clauzel 1974: 377). The development of population figures 
for all actor groups derived from this simulation is displayed in Figure 3.39 At 
least in the aftermath of the famine of 1436/39 the population of Lille did not 
grow substantially for about two decades. This can indirectly be inferred from 
two indicators – the development of direct taxes and the annual number of new 
citizens. The influx of new citizens was relatively low for many years and the 
amount of direct taxes accounted by the municipal administration dropped 
sharply during the crisis, recovered thereafter quite quickly but remained on 
this level well into the 1450’s (Sivéry 1970: 200; Clauzel 1982: 33 and 250, 
Figures I and II). 
Since the loss of that many lives has a deep impact also on the other markets 
of the urban community, a nutritional crisis does affect the structure of the 
urban economy and can of course threaten its existence as a whole. Wages rise 
substantially following the increases in grain prices because of the diminished 
aggregated labour supply of the surviving labourers (see central panel of Figure 
2). This effect can in part be seen for the Lille example in the aftermath of the 
food shortage of 1414/15 and the famine of 1436/39. The corn wage of carpen-
ters and construction workers, that is the nominal wage expressed in amounts 
of grain that can be bought with it, increased in both cases after the crisis. In 
1415, for instance, the higher sommer wage was also payed during the winter 
(Calonne/Clauzel 1974: 375-377). In case the crisis lasts for a longer period, 
this change in the labour supply can lead to a situation where many craftsmen 
are no longer able to hold on to their production level and to sell commodities 
and services. Then also craftsmen slightly begin to experience difficulties in 
meeting the subsistence level of nutritional intake. Although in this particular 
scenario of a food shortage lasting for as long as one year the number of 
craftsmen is still only marginally affected, the production of goods however 
suffers to a considerable degree from the substantial lack in the number of 
labourers. Since the production technology is assumed to rely on labour as the 
sole input factor and in general cannot be changed immediately through techni-
cal innovations or by switching to capital input, production and supply of 
commodities and services drop to a persistently lower level than before. As a 
consequence, it takes for all markets about 5-10 years to reach the pre-crisis-
level of equilibrium of market prices again. There is enough empirical evidence 
for an economic stagnation of the city of Lille in the aftermath of the severe 
famine of 1436/39. Again, this can be inferred from the taxes that were ac-
counted by the municipal administration. The amount of taxes for the control of 
linen produced in the town broke down in 1439 and recovered again only in the 
late 1440’s. The same holds for the development of the tax amount that was 
received from the control of meat that was sold on the town’s market. Also, the 
amount of money that was earned by the community by selling rights to par-
                                                          
39  See on the demographic effects of famines the study of Cotts Watkins/Menken 1985. 
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ticipate in the market first dropped within crisis and then only slowly increased 
up to the late 1450’s (Clauzel 1982: 263 f., Figures XX, XXI and XXV). The 
medium-term development in supply levels derived from simulation is depicted 
in Figure 4. In addition, these market disturbances cause a higher income dis-
parity between and also within the actor groups because of the overproportional 
drop in the labourers’ share of population, this disparity persisting for even 
longer than 10 years in the aftermath of a nutritional crisis. 
Figure 4: Development of the overall supply on markets 
 
 
What becomes different if local authorities intervene in market processes in 
such a scenario of a nutritional crisis? As has been pointed out before, medieval 
and early modern municipal councils and town officials employed a set of 
different intervention measures in reaction to food shortages and nutritional 
crises with excess mortality. Since a rent seeking behaviour of members of 
municipal councils is assumed, the main objective of local authorities will be to 
get market disturbances under control such that the different needs of distinct 
social groups could be balanced and the distribution of power within the town 
remains stable. In the present multi-agent model, the local authorities’ capabil-
ity of administering markets therefore is manifold, since it can influence market 
dynamics and price movements in several ways. In general, direct and indirect 
interventions have to be distinguished. The local authorities can try to influence 
price developments in grain and labour markets directly by setting upper limits 
to the movement of prices. They also can try to create indirectly a price level 
that would be more favourable to agents by engaging themselves as an eco-
nomic agent on these markets, for instance by supplying grain from the public 
granaries to the population of the community or by opting for a job programme. 
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The reduction of taxes also would be a more indirect form of market interven-
tion, because with such an attempt the incentive structure for agents would be 
altered. As seen above, the already mentioned series of food shortages and 
famines in early fifteenth century Lille is a good example for what measures 
commonly were taken by municipal councils in reaction to crisis. The set of 
instruments by which the market was organised consisted of orders, supporting 
measures and bans. The citizens were ordered to store themselves as much 
grain as they needed for a year. Granaries were restocked and grain was sup-
plied by the community. Control of grain transports and the production of 
bread was intensified. Exports of grain were prohibited, speculation was prose-
cuted and speculators had to bear the risk of being expropriated. Public con-
struction works were initiated in 1401/02 when parts of the city wall were 
reconstructed and in 1414 when the town’s fortifications were mended and 
reinforced.40 
Given this historical example of using multiple measures, a fairly complex 
intervention strategy is tested against the non-intervention in markets.41 As the 
local authorities are implemented as a BDI-agent, they have to decide, based on 
their beliefs, upon whether to intervene in markets or not and in which specific 
way intervention could be done, such that their desires (objectives) are going to 
be fulfilled. These beliefs embrace the current economic and demographic 
development in the urban community as well as information about the citizens’ 
contentment with this particular situation.42 The actual setting of a developing 
famine is characterised by extremely high grain prices, a situation that is satis-
fying for the merchants in the model, but is dissatisfactory for labourers. To 
prevent food riots and political upheaval, local authorities can employ at least 
two strategies. The public supply of grain from the granaries will of course 
decrease the grain price and thus satisfy labourers, but this crowding-out of 
merchants from the grain market certainly will also lead to an increasing dissat-
                                                          
40  Cf. Calonne/Clauzel 1974, pp. 378-382; Clauzel 1982, p. 213. The reinforcement of the 
town’s fortification was ordered by the Burgundian duke John the Fearless in the view of 
the military conflict between England and France. The duke of Burgundy at that time was at 
peace with the French king and feared the invasion of English troops in West Flanders. 
41  Also a simple response to price movements was tested in which intervention was restricted 
to public grain supply (Roehl 2002: 53-66 and 71-79). The results are not reported here, 
because compared to the complexity of real interventions the simple strategy obviously is 
unrealistic. 
42  Assuming municipal councils to be primarily interested in price stability for selfish political 
and economic reasons means in the model that the local authorities agent is focussed on to 
which degree citizens are satisfied with their current state of welfare. Welfare is measured 
in terms of disposable income, which is real income minus the cost of the minimal demand 
necessary for staying above the subsistence level. Contentment is measured with a com-
pound index aggregating changes in welfare as perceived by the citizens both over time – 
current wealth vs. wealth experienced one year earlier and short-term changes expressed as 
the moving average of income during the last month – and across social groups – that is 
income differentials to the average wealth in other groups relative to the situation one year 
before (Ewert/Roehl/Uhrmacher 2003: 181 f.). 
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isfaction of merchants. This discontent could be changed into contentment 
through reductions in taxes. The local authorities alternatively could increase 
the public demand for labour. Although in this case labourers would be given 
the opportunity to work and to earn money for enjoying a minimal standard of 
living at least, the crowding-out of craftsmen from the labour market now will 
leave behind this group of actors in strong discontent. Again, dissatisfaction 
could be turned into contentment by enabling craft guilds to install limits con-
cerning the number of craftsmen to work and the number of new members. In 
pursuing the goal of keeping markets stable to the highest degree possible and 
thus contenting inhabitants, the local authorities do employ instruments which 
are described as so-called plan operators and which are used to plan strategies 
of intervention. Figure 5 shows part of a plan developed by the local authorities 
agent in the model in order to deal with price movements in a situation of food 
shortage. Such a plan is generated during simulation with the help of the pro-
gram GraphPlan (Blum/Furst 1997). 
Figure 5: A plan developed by the local authorities to overcome negative ef-
fects of a nutritional crisis. 
Start
SupplyGrain DemandLabour
LowerTax InstallGuildLimit
Finish
price (grain) ⇓
cont (labourers) ⇑
cont (merchants) ⇓
price (labour) ⇑
cont (craftsmen) ⇓
cont (merchants) ⇑ cont (craftsmen) ⇑
IntentionsBeliefs
price (grain) ⇑
price (labour) ⇓
cont (merchants) ⇑
cont (craftsmen) ⇑
cont (labourers) ⇓
Desires
price (grain) ⇓
price (labour) ⇑
cont (merchants) ⇑
cont (craftmen) ⇑
cont (labourers) ⇑
GraphPlan
 
 
Simulation results show that planning local authorities who react to market 
disturbances in a complex manner are able to cope with a nutritional crisis 
rather successfully. The developed strategies combine a set of distinct instru-
ments in a goal-directed manner, that is for instance influencing the grain price 
either directly or indirectly, but employing at the same time unemployed survi-
vors in order to decrease the rising wages and probably lowering the tax bur-
den. Simulation results show, that the outcome of such an intervention pro-
gramme would be in many aspects favourable to the non-intervention strategy: 
prices do rise as well, but this increase is not as big as without intervention. 
From Figure 4 it can be seen, that also the overall quantities of grain and com-
modities supplied to the urban economy in the aftermath of the crisis are con-
siderably higher than in a situation without intervention. Moreover, markets are 
 142
able to readjust faster to the pre-crisis equilibrium. Finally and most impor-
tantly, intervention strategy helps to safe lives, with the “cost” of a smaller 
increase in the level of wealth of those surviving of course. Changes in the 
welfare status of the agents in the model, measured in terms of disposable 
income, are shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Development of the average level of welfare measured in terms of 
disposable household income 
 
 
In the simulated scenario of a nutritional crisis that lasts for one year, the 
number of losses in the group of labourers can be reduced from between one 
half to one third without intervention to about a quarter with local authorities 
intervening in markets. Thus, the structure of the urban economy is affected to 
a much smaller degree, and traditional “winners” of a nutritional crisis cannot 
benefit as much as they would do if the local authorities refrain from imple-
menting any measures of crisis management. Also, the increase in the disparity 
of income is smaller than without intervention. This has some long-run impli-
cations. As can be seen from the development of population numbers in Figure 
2, in the complex and goal-directed public intervention scenario the share of 
craftsmen and merchants a decade after the famine will be somehow bigger 
than without intervention. In the absence of in-migration this would businesses 
force to substitute capital for labour setting off technological innovations. As-
suming that merchants and craftsmen in terms of welfare are on average still 
better off than labourers, this would mean, that in any case income would be 
distributed more evenly across agents. 
These results do allow for some tentative conclusions regarding the effect 
produced by crisis management through market intervention: first of all it is 
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obvious, that it takes some time to fully overcome a nutritional crisis with 
excess mortality. The crisis itself may have already stopped after several days, 
weeks or even months, by an excellent harvest for instance, as in pre-modern 
times has been often the case – in the case of Lille in 1436/39 it was because of 
grain imports from the Baltics, that misery in West Flanders ended (Calonne/ 
Clauzel 1974: 382) –, but it takes several years to get markets back into the 
equilibrium they had been in before the outbreak of the crisis. The citizens of 
Lille experienced exactly this. Although grain prices fell fairly quickly after the 
famines of 1408/09 and 1436/39, wages remained for some years at the higher 
level they had climbed to during the respective crisis (Calonne/Clauzel 1974: 
375 f.). With such permanent upshift in the cost of labour, of course also con-
sumer goods in the medium-term did become more expensive. Secondly, the 
simulation results do indicate that market intervention in general seems to have 
an overall beneficial effect, since the pre-crisis equilibrium level of markets can 
then be obtained much faster than without any intervention. However, this 
strategy usually cannot be implemented without bearing any further costs. 
Intervention certainly has to be goal-directed and complex indeed, that is, local 
authorities have to engage in several markets at the same time in order to create 
a result that is positive for both the inhabitants and the members of municipal 
councils. The finding that intervention should be goal-directed and complex is 
coherent with findings of earlier psychological studies on how crises in com-
plex and dynamic systems can be managed (Dörner 1989). 
Could in the end the local authorities attain their primary goal to stabilise 
markets in order to prevent deprivation, discontent and possibly upheaval? 
Town officials of cities and towns in pre-modern Europe applied these routines 
in many cases, as for instance in the aftermath of the town fire in Lille, when 
the city council not only administered the city’s grain market, but also inter-
vened in the labour market. And they were doing it deliberately rather than 
intuitively, because although grain prices rose even with applying a more com-
plex strategy of market intervention, the critical price cycles nevertheless had 
lower maxima and readjusted earlier to a level that was satisfactory for con-
sumers. Thereby conflicting interests of social groups were balanced and the 
likelihood of a complete deprivation of inhabitants and of upheaval could be 
reduced. This notwithstanding, volatility of grain prices though in a much 
smaller range seems to be higher than without intervention. Thus, with market 
intervention smoothing critical peaks of the price movement might have been 
possible, but a stabilisation of prices in a way that consumers could rely on 
fixed constant prices cannot be reached. For the members of municipal councils 
who represented the town’s social élite intervention was also a kind of trade-off 
between keeping current wealth in the short-term and enjoying welfare in the 
nearer future. As can be seen from the simulated development of welfare in 
Figure 6, in the complex intervention scenario also merchants and craftsmen 
experienced cutbacks in their welfare, but after some time of recovery they 
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could on average attain a higher welfare status than without any public inter-
vention. This trade-off probably was also one critical element in the conserva-
tion of an established social hierarchy. 
5. Crisis dynamics of historical urban markets: a plea for 
complex market intervention and for historical simulation? 
With the purpose of analysing market dynamics during a food shortage and its 
aftermath in the pre-modern era, a multi-agent model is used. The model is 
built around three markets and distinguishes three groups of individual actors 
with similar but group-specific decision rules regarding the behaviour of ex-
change. An additional agent who is equipped with a limited set of means of 
intervention represents the local government. Even though this model is fairly 
complex in structure and dynamic behaviour, containing numerous agents 
acting independently from each other on the basis of relatively complex deci-
sion rules, compared to historical reality it still appears to be a rather simple 
image of a pre-modern town’s social and economic structure. This agent-based 
approach to modelling and simulation nevertheless can add to the analysis of 
economic medium-term and long-term consequences of urban food shortages 
and famines.43 Its design allows for a combination of knowledge about market 
dynamics, economic preferences and norms guiding the behaviour of individu-
als with respect to markets and governmental instruments that were employed 
in the pre-modern society. Fundamental characteristics of market dynamics in 
pre-modern urban communities can be accurately reproduced using this model 
for simulation, and the main simulation results do match experiences that many 
generations in Europe before the Industrial Revolution had made during and 
after food shortages.44 It can therefore contribute to a better understanding of 
the management of historical nutritional crises, taking into account the different 
interwoven mechanisms that drove markets and the role of agents’ preferences 
and activities during such events and in their aftermath. 
Summing up the estimation results, three points have to be highlighted: 
firstly, a compensation of troubles caused by food shortages is possible, but 
cannot be done quickly. Secondly, compensation can be achieved through 
intervention in markets, then yielding an overall beneficial long-term effect and 
reducing the time re-equilibration usually takes. Thirdly, a complex and goal-
oriented approach to market intervention has both short-term and long-term 
beneficial effects. These results are in accordance with findings of studies on 
                                                          
43  Although using simulation techniques as well, the studies of Cotts Watkins/Menken 1985 
and McIntosh 2001 are restricted to the demographic effects of crisis and famines. 
44  See for an overview of historical notes reporting the experiences of food shortages Livi-
Bacci 1991. 
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modern famines in Third World countries (Persson 1999: 47). Since economic 
and social structures in Third World countries do resemble in many respects 
those of pre-modern Europe, this is not that much astonishing. As has been the 
case in medieval and early modern urban communities, in towns and cities of 
underdeveloped countries the majority of inhabitants consists of labourers and 
craftsmen who are heavily dependent on market provision of basic foodstuffs 
like grain, vegetables, meat or milk products for being able to meet their basic 
nutritional requirements. Quite comparable to pre-modern towns, the mortality 
rate of the urban population in general is at quite high level and commonly 
inhabitants are more prone to plague and diseases than is the rural population. 
These similarities in structure but also in reaction to crisis do underline that the 
analysis of famines in current underdeveloped countries are certainly of great 
importance for the understanding of the patterns of nutritional crises in the 
history of Europe. 
There has been not much doubt about whether food shortages and nutritional 
crises are manageable, neither of theorists in modern social sciences nor of 
local authorities in historical practice. The much better performance of a com-
plex market intervention strategy in comparison to the choice of non-
intervention shows that intervention in markets is not a bad thing in itself, as 
neo-classical economic theorists have always been eager to emphasise. Given 
the plausible assumption that municipal councils in pre-modern urban commu-
nities for staying in power were primarily concerned about avoiding the imme-
diate short-term consequences of food shortages, these very likely being a 
pronounced discontent and upheaval due to deprivation, the attempt at smooth-
ing out extreme grain price volatility and balancing adverse spill-over effects to 
other markets at the same time was basically almost inevitable for municipal 
councils if they wanted to achieve this goal. Although being more or less a by-
product, the positive long-term effects of this more complex, but nevertheless 
short-term-oriented crisis management presumably could also help municipal 
councils to keep their legitimacy and to remain in a ruling position. As the 
readjustment of the urban economy happened faster and interests of all social 
groups are balanced, the citizens’ discontent with an initially unfavourable 
market development is much more limited. 
Thus, apart from explaining historical strategy choices regarding crisis man-
agement, these findings at least do justify a plea for an intelligent intervention. 
Can the results be taken for a plea for historical simulation as well? Simulation 
allows to construct a counter-factual which then serves as a point of reference 
to observable real-life phenomena. Simulating different scenarios of market 
dynamics caused by a food shortage enables to compare distinct regimes of 
public intervention and to assess both the impact of public intervention relative 
to that of non-intervention and the pace of markets’ readjustment to a pre-crisis 
equilibrium. These are features with respect to the role of market intervention, 
which are virtually impossible to be validated with historical data for simply 
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two reasons: one hardly finds an example where town officials in order to cope 
with a nutritional crisis refrained from intervention at all. Moreover, European 
towns and cities in the pre-modern era were hit by crises so frequently, that 
usually a crisis was not yet completely overcome when the next one already 
had started to develop again. Town fire, plague and several food shortages in 
early fifteenth century Lille are good examples for such a succession of critical 
events. In a historical simulation these features can be tested. Thus, although 
historical simulation certainly is limited in scope, providing historians with 
these powerful analytical capacities obviously justifies also a plea for the use of 
simulation methods in historical research. 
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